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SOME THEORETICAL ASPECTS 
OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
Joseph E. Stiglitz 
I n virtually every country, developed and developing alike, gov- 
ernments intervene in agricultural markets. They subsidize farm- 
ers (mostly in developed countries); they tax farmers (mostly in 
developing countries);1 they try to stabilize prices; they impose import 
tariffs and quotas; they restrict production; they provide food subsi- 
dies for urban areas; they support the use of fertilizer; they build 
irrigation systems; they offer extension services; they try to control 
marketing; and they provide credit, often below market rates. These 
programs have been at the center of growing controversy. They often 
impose huge financial burdens on the government and generate alloca- 
tive inefficiencies in countries that are poor enough already. Yet gov- 
ernments in developing countries often seem to doubt the advice 
offered from the developed countries to abandon these policies, when 
the developed countries engage in not dissimilar practices themselves. 
This article aims to provide a systematic framework within which 
to assess these various programs.2 The circumstances of individual 
countries differ so much that no single prescription would be appro- 
priate for all. But the framework in this article should be useful for 






A useful starting point is to ask, What are the legitimate reasons for 
government intervention in agricultural markets? In particular, what 
makes the market's own allocation either inefficient or otherwise "un- 
acceptable"? There is a standard litany of such reasons; five are 
relevant to agriculture.3 
1. Incomplete markets in insurance futures and credit. Farmers 
cannot get complete insurance against the big (output and price) risks 
they face. Rural credit markets, like agricultural insurance markets, 
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are notoriously imperfect. Farmers' access to credit is limited, if they 
can obtain it at all. They often have to pay usurious interest rates, 
though this may have something to do with the likelihood of default.4 
2. Public goods and increasing returns. These provide the justifica- 
tion for governments to finance water projects. In some cases, the 
marginal cost of using irrigated water, once the dam has been built, is 
relatively low, and the cost of monitoring water usage is relatively 
high. Water projects therefore satisfy both the criteria of pure public 
goods. The provision of water is almost always a natural monopoly, 
and a common (though not universal) response to such monopolies is 
production by government. 
3. Imperfect information. Government supply of information can be 
thought of as a type of public good. (Where the government ascer- 
tains what crops grow best in a particular area, the information is 
best described as a local public good.) However, disseminating infor- 
mation is costly, and the benefits accrue mainly to those who receive 
it. So it is probably wrong to think of agricultural extension as a pure 
public service. It may be justified, however, by the next category of 
market failure. 
4. Externalities. The successful adoption of a new technology by one 
farmer conveys valuable information to his neighbors and hence gives 
them a significant externality. The existence of this externality has been 
used to justify subsidies for farmers to adopt new technologies. 
5. Income distribution. Perhaps the most important reason for gov- 
ernment intervention in agriculture is concern with the distribution of 
income generated by free markets. Given the initial holdings of assets, 
this distribution need not, and often does not, satisfy society's ethical 
judgments. In particular, it may result in significant numbers of people 
having unacceptably low incomes or supplies of food.5 This suggests 
the government should design programs that increase the incomes of 
small farmers-and, for urban dwellers, a program of food subsidies.6 
Though this list provides various rationales for government action, 
the link between them and actual government policies may be ten- 
uous. Thus, measures aimed at reducing risk (like price stabilization 
programs) may actually increase the riskiness of farmers' income, and 
they often entail large subsidies.7 Though government policies may be 
defended in terms of helping the small farmer, the main beneficiaries 
may be large farmers. And though governments may claim that their 
policies redistribute income, the net impact of the programs may be 
regressive.8 
Critics of government programs thus claim that market failures are 
matched by a corresponding list of government failures (see Stiglitz 
1986). The fact that markets face certain problems does not in itself 
justify government intervention; it only identifies the potential area for 
it. This caveat is particularly important in any assessment of public 
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remedies for those market failures affected by imperfect information 
(for instance, imperfect credit markets), since the government is likely 
to face similar problems if it intervenes.9 
To understand the nature of government interventions in agricultural 
markets, one must approach the problem from the perspective of the 
second best. Whether government or market failures are of greater 
importance may differ from country to country, and this will crucially 
affect the nature of the appropriate government policy. Failure to recog- 
nize this fact has given rise to much of the controversy over state 
intervention. Simplistic views-such as "governments should not inter- 
vene in free markets"-or even the more sophisticated view (based on 
optimal tax theory for developed countries) that "government should 
not impose trade taxes" become inappropriate once it is recognized 
that the government has limited instruments for collecting revenue 
(thus, some distortionary taxation is necessary) and for redistributing 
income (so that the surest way of improving the lot of the rural poor 
may be through trade taxes).10 But the prescription that the government 
use trade taxes to redistribute income may be inappropriate when the 
redistributive impact of trade taxes is likely to be regressive.11 
An analysis of the appropriate policy for a particular country must 
therefore begin by specifying the reasons for market failure and the 
instruments the government can use to remedy it. The role of general 
theories is to identify the circumstances under which one kind of 
policy is more likely to be appropriate, thereby developing a taxono- 
my for analyzing policies in different countries.'2 The models for 
specific countries help to frame the policy discussion. They enable one 
to establish whether the source of disagreement over policy is differ- 
ences in objectives (welfare weights associated with different groups 
or between current generations and future generations); or differences 
in views about the structure of the economy; or differences in views 
about the values of key parameters (see Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980). 
The following sections organize the evaluation of alternative poli- 
cies around several themes: risk, incentives, credit, redistribution, dy- 
namic effects, food subsidies, and considerations of political economy. 
Risk Most economists acknowledge that farmers face significant risks 
and have only limited opportunity to avoid them through insurance 
and other markets. However, appropriate remedies are the subject of 
theoretical and practical disagreement.13 
What is of crucial importance to farmers is stabilizing their income, 
not stabilizing the prices of their produce. If price and quantity are 
negatively correlated, stabilizing prices may actually exacerbate the 
fluctuations in income. 
Some economists favor the use of futures markets. These have the 
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advantage of allowing a farmer to choose how much of his crop to 
sell forward, to "adapt" the extent of price stabilization to his own 
circumstances and preferences. But futures markets have two impor- 
tant drawbacks. First, they involve bigger transactions costs than 
those price stabilization schemes that work through the market. To 
the extent that such schemes serve to stabilize incomes, they do so 
without any farmer taking special action for himself. Second, to the 
extent that crop sizes are uncertain, no farmer can completely hedge 
his position unless he purchases crop insurance (which in general is 
unavailable). These disadvantages are not necessarily as bad as those 
produced by schemes in which the government does not stabilize the 
market price, but makes separate agreements with different farmers to 
buy given amounts of a crop at a guaranteed price. 
Despite their transactions costs, futures markets dominate most 
types of price stabilization schemes. The intuitive reason is that fu- 
tures markets allow the farmer to choose how much he wishes to 
divest himself of price risk.14 However, even in developed countries in 
which futures markets exist, farmers have not (at least until recently) 
used these markets to any significant extent.'" Thus, it remains an 
open question whether futures markets could be an effective way of 
sparing small farmers from risks. 
If governments decide to stabilize prices, they have several ways to 
do so. They can, for instance, use buffer stocks, which can be operat- 
ed according to various rules. Perfect price stability is, in essence, 
impossible. Even simple rules, such as setting a band within which 
prices can move, are not immune to speculative attack.'6 The only 
generally feasible rules involve prices being a function of the size of 
the current stock; as the amount in storage decreases, the government 
allows the price to rise. 
The limited calculations done so far suggest that the welfare gains 
from well-designed rules may be significantly greater than those from 
certain simple rules, such as keeping prices within a band (even if that 
were possible).'7 Indeed, questions may be raised about the signifi- 
cance of the latter gains altogether (Newbery and Stiglitz 1982). As 
for buffer stocks, a major criticism is that it is usually more efficient 
to store general purchasing power than specific commodities-that is, 
to use savings and reserves-except when transport and transactions 
costs are large. 
Another way for governments to try to affect price variability is to 
impose trade restrictions. These may have marked transactional ad- 
vantages over other forms of price stabilization, though they may be 
less effective in stabilizing incomes. It is now widely recognized that, 
in the presence of uncertainty (and with limited governmental ability 
to respond to changing circumstances), quotas and tariffs are not 
interchangeable. Tariffs do not insulate a country from foreign- 
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induced price fluctuations, but quotas may do so. Quotas are particu- 
larly effective when the source of price fluctuations is neither domestic 
demand nor supply; they can then completely insulate the producers 
from foreign shocks (at the cost, of course, of preventing a country 
from taking full advantage of its current comparative advantage). Quo- 
tas are also effective in the extreme case in which the only source of 
variability is domestic output; they then serve to raise prices whenever 
farmers are suffering from lower volume. Even in these circumstances, 
however, it is not clear that the gains from reducing risk exceed the 
costs of failing to take advantage of temporary comparative advantage. 
The calculations depend partly on supply responses. 
With any price stabilization scheme, supply responses are a major 
uncertainty. How do farmers react to a reduction in risk? And to 
what extent do a government's price stabilization programs serve 
simply to replace the stabilizing (arbitrage) activities of the private 
sector? Little empirical work has been done on either of these issues, 
though the effects can clearly be large: some countries have had to 
restrict their farmers' production so as to limit the costs of govern- 
ment programs. 
Though there often is a role for government intervention to reduce 
the risks faced by farmers, many of the programs justified on these 
grounds serve more to redistribute income than to stabilize it. Indeed, 
in some instances, they may actually increase the variability of in- 
come. The appeal of these programs may lie in the way that they 
conceal the size and allocation of subsidies. Were the subsidies pro- 
vided more openly, they might not be politically acceptable.'8 
Incentives The taxes and subsidies in agriculture inevitably influence the be- 
havior of farmers. They affect decisions to be a farmer and to allocate 
effort and other resources to agriculture. The most common form of 
influence occurs when governments try to tax agriculture-by taxing 
farm output directly or, equivalently, by setting up state marketing 
boards that purchase crops at less than the international price, by 
taxing export, or by putting tariffs on industrial goods."9 Lowering the 
price of farm products obviously reduces the incentives for farmers. 
Though the supply curve may bend backward in certain circum- 
stances, in general supply will be reduced when taxes get sufficiently 
high.20 The welfare losses associated with such taxes may be particu- 
larly large in sharecropping economies, where the farmer receives 
between a third and two-thirds of the value of his marginal product.2' 
Economists concerned with incentives favor land taxes over output 
taxes, since the former are close to the economists' ideal: lump-sum 
taxes. The central problem, however, seems to be valuing the land. If 
each acre of land is taxed the same, irrespective of its quality, the tax 
Joseph E. Stiglitz 47 
This content downloaded from 128.59.62.83 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 14:04:26 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
would be thought unfair. But if the quality of land is judged on the 
basis of output, then a land tax is virtually the same as an output tax. 
In many developing countries, land markets are so thin that market 
price cannot be used; even in developed countries, there is consider- 
able uncertainty about the true value of different properties. 
In many countries, governments have tried to mitigate the effects of 
output taxes by combining them with input subsidies-particularly 
for fertilizer, seeds, and credit. If all inputs were subsidized to the 
same extent, such schemes would be equivalent o reducing the output 
tax. The same results could be achieved with lower transaction costs 
by cutting the output tax directly. In fact, however, subsidies are never 
the same for all inputs, if only because some key inputs are unobserv- 
able. The schemes therefore cause distortions, boosting the use of 
subsidized inputs relative to unsubsidized items. 
According to the modern theory of the second best, the presence of 
a distortion does not mean that the subsidy policy is automatically 
bad; after all, the output tax itself induces distortions. But it is reason- 
able to suspect that, for raising a given revenue, the combination of 
taxing and subsidizing is not only transactionally inefficient, but also 
more distortive than a policy of imposing taxes on outputs and in- 
puts. In other words, the input subsidy not only distorts the input 
choice, but (because it uses revenue) also requires an even higher tax 
on output than would otherwise be needed. Recent studies have con- 
firmed this intuition; only under restrictive conditions is it desirable to 
subsidize inputs and tax output.22 In a sharecropping economy there 
are some circumstances in which a fertilizer subsidy might be desir- 
able: for instance, the increased use of fertilizer could so raise the 
marginal product of labor that workers are induced to work harder, 
even though the price they receive for their output is lower. Under 
those conditions, of course, it would have paid the landlord to subsi- 
dize the fertilizer himself; no government subsidy is required (Braver- 
man and Stiglitz 1986). 
The same analysis applies in the choice between input subsidies and 
price supports as a way of encouraging production. Input subsidies 
introduce an inefficiency in the choice of technique, a distortion that 
can be avoided by using price supports.23 (Two further arguments for 
input subsidies-that they have desirable distributional consequences 
and beneficial dynamic effects-are discussed later in this article.) 
Most developing countries produce several different crops. This 
raises the question of whether all crops should be subject to a uniform 
tax and, if taxes vary, which crops should be taxed at higher rates. 
The question involves both incentive and efficiency considerations. 
This section discusses only the former, because we have already noted 
that the key factor in determining the efficiency effects of taxes is the 
elasticity of supply. This may well differ across crops, suggesting that 
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the loss in efficiency from taxing inelastically supplied crops may be 
less than from taxing those with high elasticity.24 
One significant set of incentive issues concerns the attractions for 
rural dwellers of migrating to towns and cities; such migration often 
gives rise to urban unemployment. Migration naturally responds to 
differences in real incomes between the two sectors.25 Thus, an in- 
crease in the (relative) tax burden on farming may generate a further 
dead weight loss in extra urban unemployment. The importance of 
this obviously depends on the supply elasticity of migration, and on 
the extent of (marginally induced) urban unemployment, which in 
turn will depend on the degree of wage flexibility in urban areas. In 
some circumstances, these considerations should play a central role in 
policymaking. 
Credit It is a common observation that farmers in developing countries are 
unable to obtain credit, or that they can do so only at usurious 
interest rates.26 This is not, in itself, evidence of a market failure. 
Interest rates will be high if the probability of default is high-which 
is indeed often the case. At the same time, the fact that there is 
imperfect information on the credit risks of different individuals (the 
adverse selection problem) and on the actions of those individuals (the 
moral hazard problem) means that the market equilibrium is not, in 
general, (constrained) Pareto efficient.27 
Nonetheless, government policies to boost credit for farmers need 
to take account of these adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
The government is usually in no better (indeed, often worse) posi- 
tion for gathering information on the varying probabilities of de- 
fault. Furthermore, a government credit program that involves some 
discretion in the granting of loans also contains scope for giving 
subsidies to particular individuals: whenever a "high-risk" farmer is 
granted a loan for which the interest rate has not been increased 
accordingly, he is obtaining an implicit subsidy. It is naturally difficult 
for an outsider to judge whether a subsidy has been granted; precisely 
for this reason, such programs are open to abuse.28 
In spite of the difficulties of designing rural credit schemes, a few 
have been successful.29 Distilling the lessons of these successes (and 
the lessons from the many more numerous failures) remains a chal- 
lenge for researchers. 
Redistribution In developed countries, there is a strong presumption in favor of 
tackling distribution issues through taxing income rather than com- 
modities.30 This presumption is less strong in developing countries, 
precisely because of the limited range of redistributive instruments 
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available to the government. If the government wishes to redistribute 
income to urban dwellers, the most effective way may be a commodi- 
ty tax. Since in most developing countries people in rural areas are 
already worse off than their urban counterparts, such policies are 
regressive (see Lipton 1971). This suggests that policies which are 
notionally justified on distributional grounds may have other (for 
example, political) motivations. This in turn should make one suspi- 
cious of differential taxation: differential tax rates can be used to 
redistribute income not only from rich to poor, but also from poor to 
rich, from the politically powerless to the politically powerful, from 
one region to another. 
The structure of agricultural prices not only affects the welfare of 
the rural areas relative to the urban, but also has distributional 
effects within the countryside. These latter effects are often used to 
justify taxing one commodity at a lower rate than others (because it 
is grown mostly by poorer farmers) or subsidizing one input (be- 
cause it is used mostly by poorer farmers). An assessment of the 
distributional consequences of such policies needs to consider not 
only the direct effects, but also the indirect ones-in particular, the 
effects on the wages paid to landless laborers. Thus, if fertilizer 
decreases the marginal product of labor (at any level of input of 
labor), a subsidy on fertilizer might reduce the demand for labor and 
consequently the landless laborers' wage, in which case the distribu- 
tional consequences will be regressive. 
Ascertaining these "general equilibrium" consequences is seldom 
straightforward. Moreover, one has to be cautious about using, say, 
differential input subsidies to achieve certain distributional goals. 
Wealthier farmers are likely to use more of all inputs, including more 
fertilizer-so a fertilizer subsidy is likely to benefit them most.31 In- 
deed, in the central case of constant returns to scale, outputs and 
inputs will be precisely proportional. 
In some cases, there may be systematic differences in input-output 
ratios according to different levels of wealth, because poorer farmers 
have different qualities of land or because they face different factor 
prices (or similarly, because rental markets are imperfect, so that the 
cost per day of using, say, a tractor is greater for them than for richer 
farmers).32 
Whenever there are systematic differences in input-output ratios, it 
is possible to redistribute income through a combination of taxes and 
subsidies. But if the differences are small, of course, taxes and subsi- 
dies have to be large to attain even a limited amount of redistribu- 
tion-and the associated distortions will also be large. In many cases, 
the amount of redistribution achieved probably cannot justify the 
distortions caused by policies that simultaneously tax output and 
subsidize inputs or subsidize some inputs and tax others. 
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Dynamic 
Effects 
A rather different justification for subsidizing inputs has to do with 
the adoption of new technologies. If peasants were perfectly rational 
and risk markets were perfect, then farmers would adopt the new 
technology if it increased their expected utility. No government subsi- 
dy would be needed. 
Reality is different: risk markets are imperfect, and peasants are risk 
averse. Moreover, technologies that are riskier, but offer higher returns, 
yield more tax revenue for the government. Thus, the government has 
a real interest in encouraging the adoption of such technologies. If such 
technologies use a lot of fertilizer, for example, then a fertilizer subsidy 
may be an effective way of encouraging the adoption of the riskier 
technologies. 
There is an added (and rather distinct) justification for governments 
to encourage the use of new technologies: when one farmer tries a 
new technology, he conveys a large amount of information to his 
neighbors. The presence of these informational externalities implies 
that farmers will have insufficient incentives for trying new technolo- 
gies; the solution is to levy corrective (Pigovian) taxes or to provide 
subsidies. 
The conflict between these dynamic efficiency objectives and distri- 
butional considerations raises a familiar problem. The farmers that 
are least risk averse are likely to be the large ones, so they are likely 
to be willing to try the new technology.33 Thus, subsidies for those 
who introduce the new technology are likely to be regressive. (The 
effect may be exacerbated if the new technologies are also capital 
intensive, and the larger farmers have easier access to capital markets 
or can borrow at lower interest rates.) 
Food 
Subsidies 
The issues of pricing food in towns and cities are linked to agricul- 
tural pricing policies in several ways. First, the prices received by 
farmers and those paid by consumers will sometimes have to be the 
same; the government is unable to prevent the black markets that 
result when it tries to put a wedge between the two sets of prices. In 
that case, policies which make farmers better off (by increasing the 
prices they receive) simultaneously make those in the urban areas 
worse off. Whether these effects on urban dwellers can, or will, be 
offset depends on how their wages are determined.34 
Second, urban food subsidies are expensive: they increase the 
amount of revenue that the government must raise from other 
sources, including taxes imposed on farmers (or, alternatively, they 
reduce what the government can spend on investment and other 
programs). 
Third, in closed economies, there is a "material balance" condition: 
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if farmers produce less (because of a tax on their output), then-for 
demand to equal supply-urban prices must rise. Workers in the 
urban areas will thus be worse off, unless wages adjust. 
Both efficiency and distributional issues arise in the analysis of the 
structure of taxes and subsidies in urban areas. Efficiency discussions 
focus on the dead weight loss associated with any tax or subsidy 
structure. However, it may be misleading to try to borrow from the 
findings of optimal tax theory, as it has been conceived in developed 
countries. Central to that theory is the assumption that the economy 
is at full employment and that taxation distorts the supply of labor. (If 
the labor supply was, for instance, inelastic, then uniform taxation 
would be desirable.) As urban unemployment is a serious problem in 
many developing countries, it is implausible that governments will be 
much concerned about any slight reduction in the supply of labor. 
Moreover, under a variety of hypotheses, it seems reasonable to 
assume that wages will respond to changes in prices. This will be so 
if, for instance, workers' productivity depends on the wages they 
receive and the prices they pay, and firms set their wages to minimize 
their labor costs (per efficiency unit). In that case, if efficiency depends 
simply on the level of a worker's utility, uniform taxation is again 
desirable. But if efficiency is particularly sensitive to food prices (be- 
cause efficiency depends on nutrition), then it may indeed be desirable 
to subsidize food. This analysis will obviously vary according to the 
nature of the job. If workers in urban areas are mainly employed in 
civil service jobs, where limited physical exertion is needed, the case 
for food subsidies may be weaker than in more industrialized urban 
settings. 
The distributional effects of urban pricing policies are also likely to 
depend critically on how far food subsidies can be disaggregated. 
Thus, a uniform food subsidy is likely to have a smaller redistributive 
impact than a subsidy limited to millet, while in some countries, a 
subsidy just for rice may be regressive in its effects. If the government 
is particularly concerned with the poor yet cannot reach them direct- 
ly, it may be desirable to have general food subsidies even though 




Some of the issues discussed in this article have been a source of 
controversy for centuries. Governments have the power, through taxa- 
tion, to redistribute income from one group to another, from one 
region to another. They have often used this power to favor urban 
dwellers over farmers, though in developed countries the pattern has 
recently been reversed. These redistributive objectives (which often 
seem only by coincidence to have much to do with egalitarianism) are 
pursued quite independently of their allocative effects. It is precisely 
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these "distortionary" consequences of government intervention that 
have incurred the economists' wrath. Though it is true that the redis- 
tributive objectives might not be obtainable in a nondistortionary 
form, that does not detract from the central questions: how much 
redistribution, at what cost, and to whose benefit?35 
Policy Reform No policy is ever perfect. Even if it were perfectly adapted to the 
circumstances that prompted it, circumstances change and then 
there may be alternative policies that are more effective. The question 
of how to handle policy changes has recently been the subject of 
debate. 
Should, for instance, the government make many small changes or 
a few large changes? The first option (sometimes referred to as policy 
"reforms") has the advantage that it requires only knowledge of 
demand and supply elasticities and cross elasticities (or other vari- 
ables) in the current equilibrium. Deciding what large changes are 
desirable requires a wider knowledge of the structure of the econo- 
my-information that is seldom available (indeed, there is some ques- 
tion whether, without experiments, such information is obtainable at 
all).36 Nonetheless, there are significant (fixed) costs involved in mak- 
ing any change in policy, plus the costs of uncertainty whenever 
policy is changed frequently.37 There may also be significant distribu- 
tive consequences from policy changes that may, at best, be capri- 
cious; for example, changes in the relative taxes of different agricul- 
tural goods will change relative land values; these taxes may be borne 
mainly by those who happen to own the land at the time the tax is 
announced. 
Of course, the most significant transactional costs are the set-up 
costs involved in a particular tax or subsidy. Though simple models 
that ignore these costs might suggest that it is desirable to have, say, a 
small tax or subsidy on fertilizer, the administrative costs of setting up 
such a scheme may be largely independent of the size of the tax or 
subsidy; when these costs are taken into account, they show that a tax 
or subsidy should be applied only if it is large. Many of the major 
policy issues cannot really be considered within a framework that is 
limited to marginal changes in tax rates. 
Concluding 
Remarks 
This article has stressed that the design of agricultural policies 
should be viewed as an exercise in the theory of second best, an 
exercise requiring detailed information about a country and careful 
judgment about the nature and relative importance of market (and 
nonmarket) failures. 
Against these standards, most of the simplistic prescriptions fail. 
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The assertion that governments hould never intervene in agricultural 
markets misses the potential importance, in some cases, of market 
failures. Arguments against distortionary trade taxes often fail to 
recognize that revenue has to be raised somehow; that many govern- 
ments do not have any nondistortionary methods of raising revenue; 
and that trade taxes may have distinct transactional merits. These 
points apply even against more recent arguments that the government 
should not impose trade taxes (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971). 
Simple prescriptions have one obvious advantage: they enable econ- 
omists to make policy judgments with virtually no knowledge of the 
country in question. But the flaws in the simplistic approach make it 
all the more important to accumulate detailed information on most of 
the developing world. The first step in any systematic analysis of 
agriculture policies is therefore to describe as accurately as possible 
the consequences of each policy. This requires a model of the econo- 
my concerned-and a model appropriate for one country may not be 
for another. Recent work has clarified some of the essential ingre- 
dients of these models: wage-setting policies in the urban sector, the 
nature of rural-urban migration, and the organization of the rural 
sector-labor, land, and credit markets. This descriptive and empirical 
work is essential before it is possible to make useful normative judg- 
ments that attach welfare weights to the effects of policies on various 
groups.38 Much of the recent work in optimal tax theory can be 
criticized on the grounds that it fails to make explicit the conse- 
quences of policy for various groups, providing only a summary des- 
cription of the policy that maximizes some social welfare function.39 
The weakness of simple prescriptions hould not drive people to the 
opposite extreme of arguing that, in a second-best world, "anything is 
possible." Important qualitative statements can be made on the basis 
of certain qualitative information about the economy. This article has 
given one example of this tenet in developing countries: the simul- 
taneous imposition of input subsidies and output taxes can be shown 
to be undesirable under certain conditions. 
In any analysis of agricultural policies, the hardest part is to incor- 
porate political economy considerations-to decide what are to be 
taken as political constraints. Again, though general answers may 
be impossible, some assumptions seem more reasonable than others. 
Thus, many analyses begin with the presumption that the government 
cannot lower the urban wage, but they also assume that the wage 
will not adjust in response to price increases. They assume, in other 
words, a kind of myopia, which may be valid in the short run, but 
seems implausible in the long run. It suggests more naivete on the part 
of the economic theorist than is possessed by workers in developing 
countries. 
Economists are also concerned about how their advice will be used. 
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There is a large gap between the rationale for certain policies and 
their actual consequences; policies that are justified as redistributive, 
though they do indeed redistribute income, may do so in a regressive 
manner. This article has expressed particular doubts about policies 
involving differential taxation, which hide official subsidies and give 
the government discretion in the way they are allocated. The validity 
of these doubts may differ from country to country. But they matter 
less to the extent that economists concentrate on a positive descrip- 
tion of the consequences of alternative policies. 
Abstract In virtually every country, governments intervene in agricultural markets in a variety 
of ways-with subsidies and taxes, with credit, with price stabilization programs, and 
with expenditure programs. This article provides a systematic framework within which 
these various programs can be assessed. The analysis of any policy must begin with a 
description of its effects. An evaluation of the appropriateness of any policy must begin 
by specifying the reasons for market failure and the instruments at the disposal of the 
government. The article focuses on the consequences of imperfect risk and credit 
markets and considers the incentive and distributive effects of alternative government 
programs. 
Notes 1. See, for instance, Binswanger and Scandizzo (1983). 
2. This article is not a systematic review of the relevant literature; rather, its objective 
is to develop a perspective within which to view government policies toward agriculture. 
Bibliographical references have, accordingly, been kept to a minimum. This article 
elaborates on another recent survey (Johnson 1986). Johnson argues that "governmental 
intervention in agricultural markets should occur only when there is a strong affirmative 
case for so doing" (p. 15). The present article considers the conditions under which this 
will be true and the consequences of alternative policies under those circumstances. 
3. The following list of market failures is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. 
For instance, as noted below, problems of imperfect information provide part of the 
explanation for incomplete risk and credit markets. 
4. Insurance markets are notoriously bad in many contexts other than agricultural 
markets. Particular problems in agricultural markets are adverse selection and moral 
hazard: the farmer is likely to be better informed about the hazards he faces than the 
insurer (this is referred to as the adverse selection problem); and there are actions the 
farmer can take that affect output (or, more generally, the insurance companies' 
expected liability; this is referred to as the moral hazard problem). Thus, though the 
farmer cannot affect whether there is a hailstorm, he can affect the losses he incurs if 
one happens, by taking precautionary action. Adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems need to be taken into account in the design of insurance contracts. 
Government policies that ignore adverse selection and moral hazard may exacerbate 
the problems. Thus, government stabilization programs may induce farmers to increase 
their production of risky crops, thus imposing a greater cost on government than it 
would otherwise have to face. 
5. Most economists, believing in consumer sovereignty and individualistic social 
welfare functions, are more concerned about their low income than a low consumption 
of particular commodities, such as food or health services. There is, however, no 
unanimity on this point. Tobin (1970) for instance, has put forward the notion of 
"specific equalitarianism," arguing that society should be concerned with the levels of 
consumption of particular commodities. 
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6. What often seems of concern is not only the level of income but changes in income. 
If, for example, technological change makes many small farms economically unviable, 
government policies may be aimed at easing the transition of these small farmers out of 
agriculture. These programs may be thought of as a response to the market's failure to 
provide insurance against such changes. 
7. A pure insurance or price stabilization program would, of course, just break even, 
with losses when prices are low offset by profits when prices are high. 
8. See Braverman and Guasch (1986) for a review of the empirical findings on the 
impact of rural credit programs. 
9. Indeed, the problems associated with distinguishing between good and bad 
borrowers and of monitoring the actions of borrowers enhance the scope for political 
abuse within subsidized credit schemes. 
10. Most developing countries do not have the administrative wherewithal for an 
effective and equitable income tax system. Moreover, in economies in which private 
bookkeeping procedures are limited, the marginal social cost for implementing an 
income tax system may be unduly high. 
11. Economists naturally feel (and should feel) less confident about statements 
concerning how their advice might be used or abused. Some economists claim that their 
responsibility is limited to explaining what taxes attain what distributive goals most 
efficiently. But political processes are no less real than economic processes, even if they 
are less understood. The question can be put in a more analytical way. Assume we 
believed that the political process was well described by a majority voting model. 
Because the future is uncertain, it is obviously undesirable to specify precise tax rates. 
Economists are asked whether there should be a constitutional restriction to uniform 
taxation of commodities. An economist brought up on the Ramsey rules might be 
tempted to say no. But an economist brought up in the social choice tradition would 
ask, if we have majority voting, what kinds of differential tax rates are likely to be 
imposed? Under some circumstances, that economist might conclude that expected 
social welfare would be higher, given the political process, under a constitutional 
restriction to uniform taxation. 
12. All modeling requires simplification. Thus, the fact that a model leaves out certain 
aspects of reality is not in itself a criticism. It is, of course, essential that what is left out 
is of secondary importance. Many of the debates about the appropriateness of different 
theories turn on disagreements about the significance of some feature of the economy, 
which has been omitted from one model but plays an important role in another. 
13. For a more extensive discussion of the issues associated with risk in the context 
of developing countries, see Newbery and Stiglitz (1981). 
14. With futures markets, farmers must decide (usually before the size of their crop 
is known) how much of their crop to sell forward; if their crop exceeds the amount sold 
forward, they bear a price risk on the difference. With price stabilization schemes, the 
price is stabilized on all of their output, regardless of its size. 
15. Perhaps this is so because of the large transactions costs in these markets or 
because small farmers may feel that they are at an informational disadvantage relative 
to speculators or large trading companies (it is well known that markets with such 
asymmetric information are likely to be thin or nonexistent; see Akerlof 1970). They 
may also be concerned that such markets may be subjected to manipulation. 
16. When, for instance, the price approaches its floor, speculators believe that the 
government will probably not be able to sustain the price, so they sell their stocks, 
making it indeed impossible for the government to maintain the floor (Salant 1979). 
17. These calculations suggest that the value of social welfare is sensitive to the 
precise stabilization rule employed. This should be contrasted with calculations on, for 
instance, the optimal tax rate, where, under a variety of circumstances, it appears that 
the value of social welfare is not very sensitive to the tax rates imposed. 
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18. In many developing countries, agricultural marketing boards, which are often 
justified in terms of their role in stabilizing prices, at the same time serve to tax 
agriculture. 
19. It may not be obvious that industrial tariffs should really be viewed as a tax on 
agriculture. In a general equilibrium model, all that is relevant is relative prices. 
Increasing the price of industrial goods has the same effect as reducing the price of 
agricultural goods. This fact is, of course, eventually discovered by farmers and has been 
a source of strife in developed countries. 
20. Even if supply curves do bend backward, with income effects and substitution 
effects offsetting each other, there are dead weight welfare losses. 
21. Though the more theoretical work on sharecropping suggests that the shares 
ought to respond to these changes in circumstances, there is little evidence that they do 
so, perhaps for the reasons suggested by Allen (1985). It is important to note that the 
sharecropping system is not necessarily inefficient; that it may represent a reasonable 
response to the problems of incentives and risk in farming. (See Cheung 1969; Stiglitz 
1974.) Nonetheless, with a positive labor supply elasticity, output under sharecropping 
may be much less than it would be after a land reform, in which land was redistributed 
to the peasants. 
22. See Sah and Stiglitz (1985). These conditions entail large cross elasticities of 
demand, significant nonhomotheticity in the production function, and significant general 
equilibrium wage effects. Their analysis does not, however, apply to sharecropping. 
23. This is a heuristic argument. The general theory of the second best has empha- 
sized the inappropriateness of counting distortions. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) have 
established a general theorem concerning the desirability of production efficiency. 
Though Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1971) have noted several important limitations to that 
theorem (in particular, the theorem requires that the government have a rich set of 
instruments at its disposal), it still seems that, in the case examined here, there is a 
presumption in favor of production efficiency. 
24. Cross elasticities between the outputs of different crops must also be taken into 
account. The importance of these cross elasticities depends on how fine will be the 
differentiation among commodities. That is, the cross elasticity between two types of 
wheat is likely to be much greater than the cross elasticity between wheat and rice. 
Johnson (1986) has suggested that the differential taxes imposed on wheat relative to 
rice-which is significant in both China and India-may have more to do with the 
greater political influence of wheat farmers than rice farmers. 
25. In some cases, reducing the price received by farmers might reduce migration. If 
farmers are credit constrained, then when they are worse off they may be less able to 
finance extended unemployment in urban areas. See Kanbur (1981). 
26. For two recent surveys of the issues involved in rural credit, see Braverman and 
Guasch (1986) and Lipton (1981). 
27. That is, they are not Pareto efficient, even taking into account the limitations in 
information; there exist government policies that could, in principle, make everyone 
better off. 
28. Even the private sector has difficulty designing managerial incentive schemes to 
assess these risks. Whether a particular loan is "good" or not will often not be apparent 
for several years, after the loan officer has departed for another job. 
29. Braverman and Guasch (1986) cite several such instances, including the INVIERNO 
Development Bank Program, implemented in Nicaragua in 1975, programs in Korea (see 
also Lee and others 1977), and Kenya's Cooperative Savings Scheme (von Pischke 1983). 
30. In certain limiting cases, it can be shown that if there is an optimal (or Pareto 
efficient) tax structure, then no commodity taxes should be imposed. Even with an 
optimal linear tax, the presumption against commodity taxation remains fairly strong. 
More generally, the properties of the demand systems that determine whether commod- 
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ity taxes should be imposed and, if so, at what rates are at best hard to estimate. Thus, 
for instance, with the frequently estimated linear expenditure system, it is always the 
case with an optimal linear income tax that no commodity taxation should be imposed, 
if the only source of inequality is differences in individuals' wages (including differences 
in wealth that result from these wage differences). 
More generally, while the distortions arising from taxing commodities that are 
inelastically demanded may be small, those commodities generally have low income 
elasticities, so that taxing them has regressive distributional consequences. In many 
cases, once an optimal income tax is imposed, these distributional and incentive effects 
exactly balance each other, making it desirable to impose no commodity taxation at all. 
31. Subsidy schemes in which the size of the subsidy depends on the income of the 
farmer may be used in some circumstances. The simplest schemes enable each farmer 
to buy a given amount of fertilizer at a subsidized price. For all farmers who buy more 
than that amount, the subsidy is equivalent o a lump sum subsidy (and in this sense, 
has nothing to do with fertilizer). If black markets cannot be prevented, even those who 
use less than the given amount will purchase the subsidized fertilizer for resale. Then 
the fertilizer subsidy does nothing more than provide a uniform lump sum for all 
individuals. 
32. The cost differences associated with rental versus ownership markets may reflect 
important moral hazard problems. The fact that these differences are not a consequence 
of a "market failure" does not lessen the distributional consequences. A similar point 
applies to the different costs of capital facing different farmers. 
In some cases, incentive and distributional considerations pull in opposite directions; 
in others, they reinforce ach other. Assume, for instance, that because of lack of access 
to the capital market, poor farmers use less fertilizer. A fertilizer tax would then have 
a beneficial distributive ffect. But, at the same time, the marginal product of fertilizer 
is much higher among the poor than among the rich. A fertilizer subsidy would partly 
offset the inefficiencies arising from the poor's lack of access to capital. In this case, 
although the poor consume less fertilizer, the increment in income resulting from a 
fertilizer subsidy may be larger. 
33. Moreover, to the extent that there are fixed costs associated with acquiring 
information needed to implement a new technology, large farmers have a greater 
incentive to make the requisite expenditures. To the extent that these costs are borne 
by the government (through agricultural extension services), these effects are mitigated. 
34. See Braverman and Kanbur (1986) for a model examining these questions in an 
African context. 
35. Perhaps the question that should be posed is not, What is the optimal set of taxes 
and subsidies? Rather, the question is, Given the political processes that determine which 
taxes or subsidies will be chosen, what constraints hould be imposed on the set of 
admissible taxes or subsidies? Some contend that the answer to this question, in many 
contexts, involves uniform taxation. 
36. At issue is not the lack of econometric research or the unavailability of data. The 
economy may simply not have experienced, say, relative prices in the range in which 
some policy might take it. Though economists frequently assume constant elasticity 
functions, allowing them to project he consequences, this is little more than guess work; 
even if elasticities were approximately constant over the range of relative prices that 
have been experienced, there is no reason to believe that the elasticity would remain 
constant outside that range. 
37. Although again, it is not apparent whether there is more effective uncertainty 
associated with a large number of small changes or infrequent large changes in policy. 
38. Braverman and Hammer have emphasized in their work the importance of a 
careful positive description of the consequences of policy, incorporating the constraints 
and distortions within the country. See, for instance, Braverman and Hammer (1986); 
Braverman, Hammer, and Ayn (1986); and Braverman, Hammer, and Gron (1986). 
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39. More recent work on Pareto efficient tax structures attempts to identify the 
characteristics of the tax structures that apply regardless of the normative judgments 
employed. For a review of this work, see Stiglitz (1987). 
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